Balancing the Bankruptcy Laws:
High Rate Credit Card Lending Leads to High Bankruptcy Filing Rates
Testimony
of the National Consumer Law Center Before a Joint Committee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts House Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Gary Klein, Senior
Attorney, March 11,
1999
Introduction
Mr. Chairmen and members
of the Joint Committee, on behalf of our low-income clients, the National Consumer
Law Center(1) thanks you for inviting us to testify
today regarding consumer bankruptcies and their impact on the banking system.
There is a great deal of
misinformation circulating about the increase in bankruptcy filings and purported
abuses in the system. The reality is that more debtors use the bankruptcy system
because more debtors are having serious financial problems. American families
increasingly face foreclosure, repossession, utility shut-off, wage garnishment
and extensive collection activity on unsecured credit card debt. In short, more
American families are using the bankruptcy system, because more American families
are having trouble paying their debts.
My testimony will focus
on four questions:
Why more filings?
Does the lending industry
share responsibility for consumer financial hardship and the increase in bankruptcy
filings?
Are substantial costs of
bankruptcy passed on to non-bankrupt consumers?
Are the amendments captured
last year in the Conference Report (H.R. 3150) and reintroduced this year as
H.R. 833 fair and balanced?
I. What Has Caused the Increase in Filings?
The fact that more bankruptcies
are being filed is not evidence, in itself, that debtors are abusing the system.
The reality is that more cases are filed, because more American families are
faced with crushing debt. There is much more consumer credit outstanding than
ever before. With the additional extension of credit, comes additional risk.
(See the Case Study in the Appendix for a typical example of an American family
forced to file bankruptcy because of the convergence of consumer debt, job loss
and divorce.)
The increase in bankruptcy
filings is an unfortunate consequence of several significant structural changes
in the American economy. These changes have combined to create a rise not only
in bankruptcy, but also in foreclosures,(2) repossessions,
utility disconnections(3), credit card defaults(4)
and visits to consumer credit counseling agencies.(5)
Nevertheless banks continue to record profits, fueled in large part by credit
card income.(6)
These are the factors which
have contributed to the increase in filings:
Downsizing, economic
dislocation, income disruptions, and underemployment. Families are
increasingly impacted by instability in employment income, particularly at the
lower end of the wage spectrum.(7) Although unemployment
remains low, many workers file bankruptcy after being forced to shift to lower
paying jobs. A surprising statistic, based on data compiled by Visa and MasterCard,
is that no more than 29% of bankruptcies are caused by overspending. The balance
of filings are caused by other life events over which consumers have little
or no control.(8)
Rising debt to income
ratios. More families have more debt. Part of the reason for this is
that the lending community has aggressively marketed credit card debt,(9)
because it profits from the very high interest rates. Another factor is the
unprecedented increase in the cost of education and the corresponding increase
in student loan debt.(10) One family in six
below $25,000 in annual income, spends more than 40% of its income on debt service.(11)
Reliance on two
wage earners to make ends meet. This change in a fundamental condition
of the economy means that every family has double the risk. With two wage earners
vulnerable to income instability, any change for either one creates enormous
pressure on the family budget. Child-bearing and time off to raise children
mean that a family which was getting by on two incomes is forced to rely on
only one.
Rising divorce rates.
A corollary of the latter factor is that when a family splits up, the pressure
of running a household with less total income is impossible. Bankruptcy debtors
are disproportionately single parents.(12)
Uninsured medical
debt. At a time when a two day stay in the hospital to deliver a baby
can cost as much as $20,000, the uninsured have virtually no options to manage
medical debts.(13) Bankruptcy has played an
increasing role as the only way out.(14)
Aggressive Creditor
Collection Action. Wage garnishments, debt collection by aggressive
telephone calling, and pursuit of legal remedies push many families into bankruptcy.(15)
Few debtors can afford to pay an attorney to defend against a debt collection
or wage garnishment action even when they have valid legal defenses.(16)
Many bankruptcy filers report that their attempts at non-bankruptcy payment
arrangements were rebuffed.
Deregulation.
As rates and terms of credit have been deregulated, an increasing number of
American families have gotten credit on bad terms.(17)
High rate home equity loans, credit card interest rates exceeding 18%, and consumer
fraud tied to credit are frequent contributing causes of bankruptcy.(18)
As some borrowers are increasingly pushed into "sub-prime" loans at
high rates, the bankruptcy system is at the fulcrum of a "chicken and egg"
problem. Are high risks justifying high rates, or are the high rates causing
defaults which generate risk?(19)
More Credit Means
More Bankruptcy. The clearest correlation of bankruptcy cause and effect
is between the increase in the amount of credit outstanding and the number of
filings. The number of bankruptcies and the total amount of consumer debt in
our society have moved upward together in lockstep.(20)
It is not surprising that as more Americans borrow more money, more families
have financial troubles.
II. Does the Lending Industry Share Responsibility For Consumer Financial
Hardship and the Increase in Bankruptcy Filings?
The reasons for the increase
in bankruptcy filings are complex. Although banks and other lenders are correct
in pointing out that they are not entirely to blame, it is disingenuous of them
to assert that they should not bear some responsibility, at least to the extent
of their own conduct.
Credit solicitations and
other forms of marketing are designed to encourage consumers to rely on credit.
Much of the marketing is done to people who once would have been considered
unacceptably high risk. Due to high interest rates, the lending community has
discovered that it profits when people get in over their heads so that they
cannot pay their balance in full each month.(21)
This generates remarkable profits for banks. However, it also makes consumers
vulnerable even to small life problems which can put them over the edge.
Every American family has
a budget which represents a fixed pie. The 55 to 60 million households that
carry a credit card balance from month-to-month have an average balance of $7,000
and pay more than $1,000 per year in interest and fees.(22)
And, of course, the families that wind up in bankruptcy are almost always on
the high side of average in their debt-load and the low side of average in income.(23)
Are consumers at fault for
using the credit which is marketed to them? Of course not. Millions of American
families are not irresponsible. They are simply using the credit offered to
them for the purposes for which it is offered. Families don't go out and borrow
$7,000 on a credit card all at once. They make small purchases over a period
of time, and make the minimum payments which the lender requests. Few consumers
understand that making only the minimum payments means that their balance will
grow and payments will take an ever larger piece out of their monthly budget
(at 18% interest or higher) for debt service.(24)
Congress should not enact
legislation which undermines effective bankruptcy relief for struggling families.
Some reform is necessary, but that reform should be balanced and should help
consumers avoid the credit problems which contribute to bankruptcy.
We do not advocate that
creditors make less credit available to low and moderate income consumers, but
rather that consumers have the tools and information they need to use credit
wisely. Appropriate consumer protections designed to reinforce the lending
community's obligation to employ responsible credit practices include:
enhanced disclosure to consumers about the consequences of making minimum
payments,(25)
enhanced disclosures concerning teaser rates of interest,(26)
protections against unilateral interest rate increases which are unrelated
to a change in the lender's cost of funds,(27)
prohibition of unilateral credit limit increases,(28)
prohibition of security interests based in credit card agreements,(29)
protection against so called "cashed check loans,"(30)
prohibition of credit card cash advance machines in casinos,(31)
prohibition against making credit cards available to persons such as students
who have no present ability to make more than nominal payments,(32)
and
If lenders choose to resist
legislation to address these problems for consumers, they ought not be heard
to complain about the bankruptcies which are the inevitable result. Industry
consultants estimate that credit card companies could cut their bankruptcy losses
by more than 50% if they would institute minimal credit screening.(34)
III. Are Substantial Costs of Bankruptcy Passed on to Non-Bankrupt Consumers?
A. Is the system
failing to recapture money which debtors can afford to pay?
Nobody likes to be owed
a debt which is not paid back. Yet our society has a system of debt forgiveness
which has roots in the Bible.(35) Forgiveness
and a fresh start have always been a part of that system.(36)
A family's ability to repay
its debts is limited by its income. Data shows that Americans in bankruptcy
are far poorer than their non-bankrupt counterparts. The median after-tax income
of a family in chapter 7 bankruptcy is under $20,000, or approximately half
the national median.(37)
The credit industry has
focused substantial resources on attempting to show that despite this relative
poverty, there are many families who are obtaining a bankruptcy fresh start
even though they can afford to pay. Based on this assumption, they would set
up a system in which some debtors are forced into payment plans.
However, if such plans are
not entered voluntarily by the debtor, they have little chance of success, absent
extensive and impracticable coercive mechanisms. For this reason, forced participation
in payment plans has consistently been rejected by Congress and the two most
recent government-sponsored commissions which have studied bankruptcy.(38)
Apart from this procedural
difficulty, there is no empirical evidence which shows that debtors can afford
to pay. In 1989, Professors Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook published the results
of an evaluation of a substantial statistical database and concluded:
The overwhelming majority
of Chapter 7 debtors --90% by any measure-- could not pay their debts in Chapter
13 and maintain even the barest standard of living. ... A new bankruptcy regime
that invested more time to find and to investigate the potential can-pay debtors
would prompt only a small amount of new repayment. This is the classic case
in which a policy maker asks if the game is worth the candle.(39)
The creditor industry's
own study released last year,(40) purporting
to show the opposite, has been severely criticized by the General Accounting
Office.(41) Once the credit industry study's
results are adjusted to take account of the GAO critique, it shows that only
about 5% of debts could be repaid by debtors -- if they undergo five year
repayment plans.(42) This means that the
creditor's own study ultimately shows that bankruptcy debtors can afford to
pay about a penny on the dollar per year. That result was supported recently
by a study funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute showing that only 3%
of chapter 7 debtors can afford to pay back their debts in a hypothetical chapter
13 plan.(43)
Outside bankruptcy, no reasonable
creditor would spend more than a penny to collect a penny. Proposals to require
five year payment plans for many more debtors have a heavy price tag, including
costs of administration and monitoring, costs to resolve disputes about capacity
to repay, and costs of collecting and distributing payments.
Either the taxpayer would
have to fund these costs, or if they are debtor funded, they will reduce the
receipts available to creditors in a repayment plan. If taxpayer funded, every
American would be helping banks and other creditors collect their one cent per
dollar per year. If debtor funded, the one cent per dollar per year repayment
capacity of debtors is even further reduced.
Finally, requiring five
year repayment plans would have enormous social and human costs. People use
the bankruptcy system for many legitimate reasons. If navigating the system
is made more difficult, and if a meaningful fresh start is denied when some
cases inevitably fail,(44) more debtors would
be left with the burden of unmanageable debts.(45)
Loss of homes, repossessions, wage garnishments, utility shut-off and family
stress associated with unmanageable debts would be the inevitable result. While
these social and human costs of denying chapter 7 relief to debtors may be difficult
to quantify, they nevertheless remain an important part of the relevant equation.
B. Are losses associated
with bankruptcy being passed on to other better off consumers in the form of
higher interest rates?
The banking industry has
claimed that it is losing 40 billion dollars each year to the bankruptcy system
and that it is passing those costs on to consumers at the rate of $400 per family.(46)These numbers are ridiculous. Families may be discharging debt in bankruptcy,
but the creditor's own study, discussed above, shows that these are not debts
which consumers can afford to pay.
In reality, the lending
community is scapegoating the bankruptcy system for losses associated with bad
loans. The vast majority of debts which are discharged in bankruptcy would have
been written off if no bankruptcy had intervened. The only impact of bankruptcy
is that it gives debtors a legally enforceable fresh start -- the same second
chance which has been guaranteed since Biblical times.
Equally important, there
is no evidence that lenders would reduce rates on unsecured consumer lending
if they could avoid bankruptcy losses. Between 1980 and 1992, the federal funds
rate at which banks borrow fell from 13.4% to 3.5%. Nevertheless, credit card
interest rates actually rose.(47) How likely
is it that other types of savings, if any could be realized, would be passed
on to consumers rather than investors?
To a large extent, the bankruptcy
"problem" is nothing but a "bad loan" problem. It could
be fixed if lenders were more closely attentive to underwriting. For the most
part, the lending community has chosen not to take this step. The present interest
rate environment has taught lenders that substantial profits can be made from
extending credit to risky borrowers, such as college students. However, in exchange,
the banking community must accept that it is reaching some borrowers who cannot
afford to pay.
IV. Are the Amendments Captured Last Year in the Conference Report (H.R. 3150)
and Reintroduced This Year as H.R. 833 Fair and Balanced?
The bankruptcy system established
in 1978 has been remarkably efficient. It provides critical relief to financially
troubled American families at a low cost to taxpayers. Over the years, many
open issues under the bankruptcy law have been resolved by court decisions and
carefully crafted Congressional amendments.
To the extent the increase
in the number of bankruptcies suggests that there are problems in the consumer
lending system, responsibility for fixing those problems must be shared between
consumers and lenders. Congressional reform, if any, should be balanced and
narrowly targeted at abuses by both debtors and creditors.
It would be a mistake to
enact reforms without addressing reckless lender conduct which pushes people
into bankruptcy. Offering additional credit, for example, to families already
struggling to pay their debts hurts not only borrowers, but also the borrowers'
honest creditors if the new credit pushes the family over the edge. Similarly,
failure by one creditor to seriously consider payment arrangements outside bankruptcy
for families facing hardship may lead to a bankruptcy filing which affects all
creditors.
To the extent there has
been a focus on debtor misconduct, the burden of proof remains on the credit
industry. To date it has not been met. Simply saying that more people are using
the system, is not proof that people are misusing the system.
Some observers ignore the
fact that the present system already has a variety of protections which are
designed to effectively root out abuses by debtors. These include: Rule 9011,(48)
objections to discharge,(49) complaints to determine
dischargeability,(50) good faith requirements,(51)
Rule 2004 examinations,(52) creditors' meetings,(53)
dismissals for substantial abuse,(54) and criminal
sanctions.(55) Indeed, it is unclear why the
creditor community does not believe that the small number of cases where significant
repayment appears possible are not resolvable under the "substantial abuse"
test of 11 U.S.C. 707(b).(56) Perhaps additional
tightening of this provision would make it work better.
An additional set of balanced
reforms may be appropriate as long as they do no harm to the majority of honest
debtors who urgently need help. Provisions should be narrowly targeted to address
debtors who truly are abusing the system without affecting lower income debtors
who would be hurt by having to litigate additional issues. Creditors should
not be allowed to obtain leverage by forcing new litigation on consumers who
cannot afford to pay the costs of defending.
Appropriate reforms should
also create incentives for debtors to use a repayment plan option in bankruptcy
in order to repay their debts. Significant actions could be taken to make the
costs of those plans more manageable and to enhance outcomes for debtors who
complete plans.(57) Provisions in H.R. 833 which
limit stripdown related to automobiles and personal property and which require
debtors in chapter 13 to litigate many new dischargeability issues will undermine
chapter 13 rather than reinforce it.
Finally, the system should
penalize dishonest creditors. These include creditors whose actions push people
into bankruptcy and those who take advantage of debtors after they file by coercing
inappropriate reaffirmation agreements.
Honest and careful creditors
should always be paid before abusive debt collectors, lenders that encourage
gambling in casinos, predatory second mortgage lenders, and lenders who are
unreasonable in refusing to accept non-bankruptcy payment plans. Lenders whose
actions violate the bankruptcy laws should be subjected to meaningful and straightforward
penalties.
Conclusion
The lending community should
not be allowed to scapegoat the bankruptcy system for lending decisions which
result in bad debt. The right to participate in the bankruptcy system should
require honesty not just on the part of debtors, but also by creditors. No legislative
action should ignore the significant hardships of the millions of American families
who are overwhelmed by debt.
Appendix
Case Study
Mrs. M is a 39-year old
mother of three children, two of whom are living at home. Her financial problems
started in 1994 when her husband lost his job in construction. Since that time,
he has been underemployed; his earnings have declined from an average of $52,000
annually between 1990 and 1993 to an average of $26,000 between 1994 and 1997.
Starting in 1994, the family's primary income has been $30,000 which Mrs. M
earns as an administrative assistant at an insurance company. Mr. and Mrs. M
have struggled successfully to maintain payments on a home they bought in 1987
since their financial problems began in 1994.
Mr. and Mrs. M have also
had significant credit card bills since the late 1980's. Despite their financial
problems, they avoided default on those debts by making minimum payments between
1994 and 1997. However, the total amount of their credit card debts increased
from about $11,000 in 1994 to about $29,000 in 1997, largely due to the accumulation
of interest at an average annual rate of 17.5%.
In 1997, Mrs. M's financial
problems worsened, because Mr. M moved out of the family home. An additional
strain was created because Mrs. M attempted to provide financial help to her
oldest daughter who began her first year of college. In family counseling, Mr.
and Mrs. M acknowledged that their marriage was breaking up largely because
of the constant pressure of financial problems and Mr. M's continuing inability
to find steady work.
Mrs. M attempted to make
payment arrangements with her credit card lenders so that she could focus on
her mortgage obligation. She was told that no payment arrangements were possible
and that she should "borrow money to pay off the debts." Mrs. M went
to consumer credit counseling where she was advised that her budget did not
support any payments on credit cards. She was advised to consider chapter 7
bankruptcy in order to eliminate the credit card debts so that she could maintain
her payments on the mortgage.
In September 1997, Mrs.
M obtained advice from a bankruptcy lawyer and reluctantly filed bankruptcy.
She will discharge approximately $35,000 in unsecured debts. She will reaffirm
and continue to make payments on her mortgage and car loan -- totaling $1,320
monthly.
_______________________________________
1. The
National Consumer Law Center is a nonprofit organization specializing in consumer
credit issues on behalf of low-income people. We work with thousands of legal
services, government and private attorneys around the country, representing
low-income and elderly individuals who request our assistance with the analysis
of credit transactions. The National Consumer Law Center also serves as an advocate
for low-income consumers on consumer lending and bankruptcy. NCLC publishes
materials for lawyers and consumers, including the nationally acclaimed book
Surviving Debt: A Guide for Consumers. NCLC has trained lawyers and counselors
nationwide on consumer protection issues relevant to low-income consumers.
My experience includes 14
years as an attorney representing clients in bankruptcy, as an advocate for
consumers on bankruptcy issues, as a teacher and trainer of other lawyers, and
as an author of books on bankruptcy and consumer debt. My work also focuses
on helping homeowners with financial problems avoid foreclosure. The bankruptcy
system has always provided an important means to that end.
2. Foreclosures
have more than tripled since 1980. There were approximately half a million foreclosures
in 1998.
3. See
National Consumer Law Center, "The Energy Affordabilty Crisis of Older
Americans" p. 23 (August, 1995).
4. Ausubel,
"Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy", 71 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 250 (1997); See Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends
in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at
p. 1.
5. The
number of consumers who have visited consumer credit counseling for help in
the last 20 years has increased at a faster rate than bankruptcy filings. More
than two million families sought such help in 1998.
6. Commercial
banks earned 14.8 billion in the third quarter of 1997, the third consecutive
quarter of record profits and the 19th consecutive quarter involving profits
of more than 10 billion. See Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card
Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 250 (1997) for a discussion of the
role of credit card profits in the current boom in banking.
7. Even
MasterCard recognizes this trend. In its recent report on debt and bankruptcy,
its economist states: "Stagnation in real wages during the last 20 years
and the growing disparity in income and wealth, ... have almost certainly contributed
to the rise in personal bankruptcies. Declines in income caused by job loss
make it more difficult for those affected to service previously accumulated
debt." Chimerine, "Americans in Debt: The Reality", p.24 (MasterCard
International 1997).
8. Id.
at p. 25. And even the 29% figure is acknowledged to overstate spending problems
as a contributing cause of bankruptcy. Id.
9. More
than three billion credit card solicitations were sent out in 1997 and 1998.Consumer
Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness"
(Report issued July, 1998) at Table 2 (citing industry sources).See
Hays, "Banks Marketing Blitz Yields Rash of Defaults" Wall Street
Journal, p. B1 (September 25, 1996). MBNA, one of the largest issuers, claims
30 million credit card solicitations each month in 1997 together with 6 million
phone solicitations. Hansell, "A Banking Powerhouse of Cards", N.Y.
Times, p. C1 (October 22, 1997).
10. See
Chacon, "Debt Burden Soaring for U.S. Students" Boston Globe, p. 1
(October 23, 1997). According to the Nellie Mae study on which the article is
based, an average student's debt increased from $8,200 in 1991 to $18,800 in
1997.
11. "Family
Finances in the United States: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances"
Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. 1, 21 at Table 14 (January, 1997). Overall, the
rate is one family in nine.
12. See
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors, pp. 147-165 (Oxford
University Press, 1989).
13. See
Hildebrandt and Thomas, "The Rising Cost of Medical Care and Its Effect
on Inflation", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Econ. Rev. p. 47 (Sept./Oct.
1991).
14.
Domowitz & Sartrain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, p.
25 (1997).
15. See
Dugas, "Special Report: Going Broke, Wage Garnishments a Key Factor"
USA Today, p. 1A (June 10, 1997); Hansell, "We Like You. We Care About
You. Now Pay Up. Debt Collecting Gets a Perky Face and Longer Arms", NY
Times, F.1 (Jan. 26, 1997).
16.
Forrester, "Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement
Financing," 75 Ore. L.Rev. 1095 (Winter 1996); Sterling & Shrag, "Default
Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?" 67 Denv. U. L. R.
357, 384 (1990).
17. See,
e.g, Adding Insult to Injury: Credit on the Fringe, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Rehm, In a First, FDIC Warns Banks About Dangers
of Sub-Prime Lending, 162 Am. Banker 2 (May 13, 1997).
18. See
Forrester, "Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the
Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing" 69 Tul. L. Rev.
373 (1994).
19. Home
mortgage loans with high loan-to-value ratios, particularly so-called 125% loans,
are the major component of the recent surge in home equity lending, both in
the prime and subprime markets. Recent growth in the volume of 125% loans has
been unprecedented: 1995--$1 billion; 1996--$4 billion; 1997--$10 billion; 1998--an
estimated $20 billion. Although such loans are at least partially secured by
the debtors' homes and can result in the loss of the home, they carry interest
rates much closer to those of credit cards, in the 13-15% range. See "A
125% Solution to Card Debt Stirs Worry," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17,
1997
20.
Three neutral academic studies show this remarkable correlation. Ausubel, Credit
Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 250 (1997);
Bhandari & Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis,
67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (1993); Statement of Kim Kowalewski, Chief, Financial and
General Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Congressional Budget Office, before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Courts, (April 11, 1997). These studies stand is sharp contrast
to credit industry funded studies which purport to show otherwise.
21.
Borrowers who maintain balances pay interest at rates which typically range
from 14.5 to 19.8%.
22. See
Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing
and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at p. 1.
23. Research
shows that the median after-tax income of debtors is under $20,000 annually.
Id. $1,000 in annual debt service expenses can thus be a very meaningful proportion
of a debtor's income.
24. Industry
analysts estimate that, using a typical minimum monthly payment rate on a credit
card, it would take 34 years to pay off a $2,500 loan, and total payments would
exceed 300% of the original principal. George M. Salem and Aaron C. Clark, GKM
Banking Industry Report, Bank Credit Cards: Loan Loss Risks are Growing, p.
25 (June 11, 1996). Credit card statements, unlike mortgage loans and car loans,
do not disclose the amortization rates or the total interest that will be paid
if the cardholder makes only the minimum monthly payment See 11 U.S.C.
1637. A provision which would require new Truth in Lending disclosures on these
issues was included in the bill passed by the Senate ( 209), but deleted from
the Conference Report.
25.
Minimum payments on many credit cards will not amortize the loan, thus sucking
people in over their heads. If minimum payment terms are offered which won't
amortize the debt in two years, consumers should be told, in clear and conspicuous
language, what they need to pay, if they make no further charges, in order to
pay off the loan over a two year period.
26.
Low initial rates are designed to encourage consumers to use credit in the first
months after credit is granted. Many consumers do not understand what the permanent
rate will be or the impact of the rate change on a large unpaid balance.
27.
Some lenders raise rates arbitrarily after consumer balances reach a certain
level. Interest rate changes should be tied to an actual change in the interest
rate environment so that consumers are not caught unawares. See, Hershey, "Sales
of Credit Card Accounts Are Hurting Many Consumers," NY Times, March 2,
1999, p.A1 (documenting the effect of unilateral interest rate changes."
28.
When a lender extends a consumer's credit limit unilaterally, in some cases
after a consumer is already struggling with the existing balance, the message
is that the lender believes that the consumer can afford to take on more credit.
Consumers would not be hurt by having to ask for more credit, rather than having
it offered unilaterally. Such a request should trigger at least minimal underwriting
requirements.
29.
These hidden security interests in items of property which have no resale value
to the creditor provide inappropriate leverage to lenders in the collection
process even though there is no potential that the lender could make money in
the event of repossession.
30.
Consumers receive checks from several major lenders in the mail for as much
as $5,000. Not everyone understands that cashing these checks can lead to acceptance
of high rate credit terms. In addition, providing preapproved credit through
cashed checks eliminates the cooling off period which more common credit application
processes provide.
31.
With credit card cash advance machines prevalent in casinos, is it surprising
that some gamblers get overextended on credit and file bankruptcy based on those
credit card debts?
32.
Offering credit aggressively to college students who cannot afford to pay off
their debts until they join the work force some years later is prevalent because
interest mounts until the debt is paid. By lending aggressively to college students,
at a time in life when money is scarce, our society runs the risk of saddling
people early in life with an unmanageable problem which will later preclude
more important uses of credit such as purchase of a home and car. See US PIRG,
"The Campus Credit Card Trap: Results of a PIRG Survey of College Student"
(September 1998).
33.
Competition in the market has not worked to keep rates at reasonable levels.
On a procedural level, the Supreme Court has held that credit card lenders can
rely on the law in the state where they are incorporated in setting the interest
rate and many of the other terms of credit for consumers nationwide. This has
led to a "race to the bottom". States deregulate in order to create
the best possible environment to encourage a credit card company to locate there
in order to export terms of credit across the country. This helps certain states
create jobs. However, it means that those other states that do want to regulate
for the benefit of their citizens can no longer do so. Either states should
be freed to create and enforce meaningful regulations or the federal government
should step in with consumer protections.
34. George
M. Salem and Aaron C. Clark, GKM Banking Industry Report, Bank Credit Cards:
Loan Loss Risks are Growing, p. 25 (June 11, 1996).
35.
Deuteronomy 15:1-2 ("At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a
release. And this is the manner of the release: every creditor shall release
that which he has lent unto his neighbor and his brother, because the Lord's
release hath been proclaimed".) 35
36. Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See Gross, Failure and
Forgiveness, ch. 6 (Yale University Press 1997).
37. Consumer
Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness"
(Report issued July, 1998) at p. 1; Warren, "The Bankruptcy Crisis"
73 Ind. L. J. 1081, 1102-1103 (Fall 1998); Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook,
"Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts
1981-1991", 68 Am Bankr. L. J. p. 121, 128 (1994).
38. See
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part I
at 159 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 120-121 (1977); Report
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Vol. 1, at pp. 89-91 (October
20, 1997).
39.
Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We Forgive
Our Debtors, pp. 205-206 (Oxford University Press, 1989). This seminal book
and the empirical work which underlies it remains the single most authoritative
published source for studying bankruptcy demographics. It has been updated more
recently in an article by the same authors which concludes that debtors are
now even poorer and less able to pay their debts than they were when the initial
study was done. "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison
of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991", 68 Am Bankr. L. J. 121 (1994).
40.
Barron and Staten, "Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on Petitioners' Ability
to Pay", Monograph 33, Georgetown U. Credit Research Center (1997). This
report is reprinted as Appendix G-2.b to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Report.
41. GAO
Report, Personal Bankruptcy, The Credit Research Center Report on Debtors' Ability
to Pay, GAO/GGD-98-47, p. 6 (Feb, 9, 1998) The GAO concluded that the study's
"fundamental assumptions were not validated". In addition, the
GAO review concluded that the credit industry's study: failed to assess the
accuracy of the data collected; failed to account for major expenses which bankruptcy
debtors have after filing including payments on non-housing secured debt and
reaffirmed or non-discharged non-priority debts; failed to evaluate potential
differences among the sites chosen for the study; and failed to use statistically
valid research techniques.
42.
Warren, "The Bankruptcy Crisis" 73 Ind. L. J. 1081 (Fall 1998); Klein,
"Means Tested Bankruptcy: What Would it Mean?" 28 U. Mem. L. Rev.
711 (Spring, 1998).
43. Culhane
and White, "Means Testing for Chapter 7 Debtors: Repayment Capacity Untapped?"
(American Bankruptcy Institute, 1998).
44.
67% of repayment plan cases fail under current law. There is every reason to
think that if economically marginal debtors are forced into involuntary repayment
plans, the failure rate would be higher.
45. See
D. Caplovitz, Consumers In Trouble: A Story of Debtors in Default pp. 280-285
(Free Press, 1974).
46. The
unpublished credit industry-funded report which served as the basis for this
claim has also been criticized by the GAO for lack of analytical rigor. GAO/GGD-98-116R
"The Financial Costs of Personal Bankruptcy" Letter from Associate
Director Richard Stana to the Honorable Martin T. Meehan.
47.
Medoff and Harless, The Indebted Society, at pp. 12-13 (Little, Brown
& Co. 1996).
51. See,
e.g., In re Barrett, 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that debtor's
second chapter 13 filing, when he had insufficient income to support plan, was
in bad faith but that third chapter 13 case, after circumstances had changed
was not in bad faith); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992).
52.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. It is hard to see why creditors concerned about abuses
can't utilize the examination process to uncover them. If it is not financially
feasible for a creditor to pursue an examination, why should taxpayers instead
bear that burden for the creditor's benefit.
55.
18 U.S.C. 151-157. Bankruptcy fraud is punishable by fine and imprisonment for
up to five years. 18 U.S.C. 157.
56.
That is the provision which Congress added to the Code in 1984 and which has
functioned to root out debtors who can afford to pay their creditors. See,
e.g., In re Kelly, 841 B.R. 908 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Krohn, 886 F.3rd
123 (6th Cir. 1989) (substantial abuse found where debtors could pay back their
debts with "good, old fashioned belt tightening").
57. For example, efforts should be made to provide improved
credit reporting for people who complete chapter 13 payment plans. In addition,
the discharge available in chapter 13 should be as broad as possible in order
to serve as incentive to choose that chapter. Costs can be lowered by encouraging
secured lenders to accept modifications to their mortgages in exchange for more
favorable treatment.