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Home > Initiatives > E-Commerce > Consumer Protection in E-Commerce > NCLC Reports Article Regarding UETA - Uniform Electronic Transactions Act   Printer-friendly
 

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Challenges and Opportunities

 

            Should a lender be allowed to send a foreclosure notice only to an email address that is five years old?

Should a salesperson be able to sign a consumer up to receive all future notices by email when the consumer doesn't even own a computer?

Should utility shutoff warnings go only to an email address that might be shared within a family and checked primarily by the children?

If a consumer needs a paper copy of a disclosure or contract notice sent by email, should the consumer have to pay a fee to get a copy of that notice?

If a law requires a certain type of contract to be in writing, should a record of a phone call satisfy that requirement?

All of these things will be permitted by the new Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).  UETA is coming soon to your state legislature.

 

What is UETA?

UETA is a uniform law approved July 1999 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).  UETA is a uniform statute that, if adopted by state legislatures, will give broad legal parity to electronic records with paper records, and parity to electronic signatures with ordinary signatures.

 

UETA is built on these three premises:

1) That most state law requirements for a writing can be satisfied by an electronic record, including an email.

2) That most state law requirements for a signature can be satisfied by an electronic signature.

3) In most cases, parties should be able to agree to any form of electronic communication defined by the contract.

Each of these premises can be untrue in consumer contracts. 

The first premise will be true in only some consumer situations.  An electronic record may be just as good as a written record for a transaction that is completed in 30 days, but a consumer entering into a five‑year car loan or a 30‑year mortgage may need the note and contract in a form in which he or she can keep.  Home computers are replaced every few years, and previously downloaded contracts are unlikely to be copied over to a new system.  Change of terms notices for an Internet service provider probably should be delivered by email, but a notice that your car is being recalled for a safety problem should arrive in the mail. 

The first premise also assumes that email arrives at least as reliably as regular mail, which is contrary to the experience of many consumers.  Consumers currently may change email addresses more frequently than they move, and consumers with email addresses seem to check them either far more frequently or far less frequently than their daily check of the regular mail.  In addition, an Internet mail provider may go out of business, leaving a consumer with no choice but to obtain a new email address.

As to the second premise, an electronic signature does not always fully serve the purposes of a written signature.  Where there is a risk of forgery, a written signature may provide additional safeguards because it may be harder to forge than a purported electronic signature.   An electronic click made at home may not serve the purpose of emphasizing the seriousness or the particular risks of a transaction as well as a written signature.

The third premise of UETA is reflected in the broad deference it gives to the autonomy of contracting parties.  It defers to the agreement without distinguishing between negotiated agreements and standard form contracts.  This approach gives wide latitude to drafters of standard form contracts to define and impose the conditions of electronic communication.

For example, UETA adopts the principle that each party should be able to determine when it will receive information electronically, and when it wishes to insist on receiving a paper communication.  This sounds good in theory, but in practice it allows one‑sided contracts.  UETA will allow an on‑line seller to insist on sending all information to the consumer electronically, but then in turn require that the consumer must communicate any complaints, refund requests, billing disputes or other communications to the same company only by regular mail.

Here is another example of a perverse effect created by UETA's rule of autonomy to contracting parties.  UETA contains definitions of both "sent" and "received."  These definitions say that material is sent when it enters a computer system or part of a server that is outside the control of the sender, and that information is received when it enters the recipient's computer.  These definitions have loopholes‑they define a message to have been received even when the recipient can't open or read it; or when the message was automatically discarded by a junk mail filter.  The definitions nevertheless do capture the basic idea that something is received when it gets to you or to a place where you can retrieve it.  However, UETA then permits the parties to vary these definitions so that "sent" and "received" can be redefined to be anything to which the parties agree.  Under UETA, a web seller could define information to have been received by the buyer at the moment that the seller posts that information to its own web site‑even if the customer doesn't even know that the information has been posted.

Here are some of the problems with UETA. 

It:

* Permits using a paper contract followed by an electronic change or restriction in the terms of that paper contract.

* Permits using email to substitute for legal requirements to provide a paper notice even when the consumer has not been doing business with the company by email.

* Permits an electronic signature to be made to a paper record. 

* Exposes consumers to the risk that notices with a legal or contractual effect will be sent only to a rarely checked email address.

* Exposes consumers to the risk that notices with a legal or contractual effect will be considered received even if the consumer is unable to open or read them, or if the notice is automatically discarded by a junk mail filter.

* Permits a party to redefine sending and receipt so that both are satisfied merely by posting a notice to a web site.

* May permit a record of a telephone call to substitute for a written record.  UETA defines an electronic record to include information that is either inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.  A telephone call that is tape‑recorded or digitally retrievable is an electronic record under this definition.

* Fails to include a right to a free, written copy of a contract or notice delivered electronically.

* Lacks a rule stating that an electronic record is not considered delivered if it is delivered in a form in which it cannot be opened and read by the recipient.

* Offers no unfettered right on the part of the consumer to revoke an authorization to communicate electronically and revert to paper communication.  (The consumer may revoke with respect to future transactions, but not for this transaction).

* Lacks a statutory restriction on use of old email addresses.  Even in a five‑year car loan or a 30‑year mortgage, UETA would allow the creditor to keep using the same email address whether or not there is any reason to believe that address is still good.  UETA does contain a limited restriction on the use of bad addresses if the email bounces back to the sender. 

 

What should be done with UETA?

UETA presents challenges for consumer advocates.  Electronic commerce has pluses and minuses for consumers.  For those consumers who have access to the Internet, on‑line shopping holds out the promise of increased price competition and selection.  At the same time, electronic commerce also offers some new opportunities for sellers to hide contract terms, posting them in ways that make the consumer unlikely to find or read them, or even sending the terms only after payment.  UETA also creates some new opportunities for scam artists by allowing a seller to switch to electronic communication after a paper contract has been signed.

Because this new law was introduced early in California, some important improvements for consumers appear in the California version.  These improvements are absent from the uniform version which will be offered in other state legislatures.  Legislators, consumer law enforcement officials, consumer advocates, and legislative staff should consider insisting upon both the California changes and other improvements to UETA before it moves forward in their states.

 

Action needed

Two kinds of changes should be made to UETA in each state legislature.  First, legislators, consumer law enforcement officials, consumer advocates, or legislative staff in each state will have to develop a list of state statutes which should be exempt from the general UETA rule permitting electronic records and electronic signatures to replace written records and signatures.  Second, both the California amendments and certain other consumer protections should be added.

 

Statutes that should be exempt from UETA

Section 3 of UETA contains a placeholder for insertion of a list of state statutes to be exempted.  That list will have to be developed and sought in each state legislature.  At least these four types of statutes identified below should be exempted from UETA by each state legislature.  All four types were exempted in the California version of UETA.

* All statutes that require that specifically identifiable text or disclosures in a record or a portion of a record be separately signed or initialed.  Separate signature and separate initialing requirements are often used in state consumer law to draw attention to contractual provisions with a special impact on the customer.  These statutes should be exempted as a category, without having to list each one.  If these statutes are left under UETA, some of their requirements may be weakened by UETA's broad substitution of electronic signatures for ordinary signatures.

* Statutes with special notice requirements or for notices which trigger legal rights such as the running of a time period to appeal.  Special notice statutes include a notice before infringing upon a medical patient's privacy.  Notices affecting legal rights include health‑care denial notices.

* Statutes affecting post‑contract rights or activities.  Examples of these statutes include foreclosure statutes, auto conditional sale and loan repossession‑related notices, and eviction notices.

* Statutes which were passed to restrain particular types of activities.  Statutes falling into this category include statutes requiring notices before life, health and Medigap insurance policies may be replaced; credit repair statutes, and statutes addressing the rent‑to‑own business, payday loans, and foreclosure consultants.

 

Substantive amendments needed for UETA

Consumer protection law enforcement officers and consumer advocates should consider asking that certain basic consumer protections be added as a precondition to UETA's braod substitution of electronic records for writings and of electronic signatures for written signatures.  The needed improvements to UETA include:

* Restrict UETA only to agreements to communicate electronically which are made electronically.  [This change was made in the California UETA bill.]  A seller should not be able to use a preprinted paper contract to sign a consumer up to receive all future communications by email.  Requiring that the initial agreement be made electronically at least ensures that the consumer had the capacity to process email at the time the agreement was first made.

* Add a right to revoke an authorization to receive communications electronically.  [This change was made in the California UETA bill.]

* Restrict the use of stale email addresses.

* Add a requirement of good faith and fair dealing in the implementation of an agreement to communicate electronically.

* Delete transactions resulting from telephone calls for personal, family, or household purposes from coverage of the Act, and narrow the definition of electronic record so it doesn't include phone calls.

* Add a right to get a paper copy of any document delivered electronically at any time and without charge.  Consumers are unlikely to request a paper copy unless they need one.  When they need a paper copy, they should be able to get it promptly and without a fee.

* Tighten the definitions of "send" and "receive" so that they cannot be unreasonably varied by agreement.  [This change was made in the California UETA bill.]

* Restrict redefinition by agreement of "sent" and "received."  A contract should not be able to promise to send something and then redefine sending to equal "come and get it from our web site."  There are situations where it makes sense to tell the consumer to come and retrieve information, but many other situations where it does not.  However, a seller shouldn't be able to promise to send information and then redefine sending to be "come and look for it."  [The California version of UETA contains a reasonableness restriction on redefinitions of sent and received.]

* Require that if notices of the right to cancel are delivered electronically, then the right to cancel must also be permitted to be exercised electronically. [This change was made in the California UETA bill.]  The current rule of UETA could lead to confusion: it would allow a seller to email the notice of right to cancel but insist that the notice be mailed back to exercise that right.

* Define the on‑line consumer transaction to have been made at the consumer's home.

* Remove the loophole in the section creating an error defense for orders placed using electronic agents, so that the defense does not become unavailable merely because there was a confirmation screen in the process.

* Tighten the definition of an electronic signature so that it must occur in connection with an electronic record, not a paper one.  [We are waiting to see if this change will be made in the California UETA bill.]

* Eliminate the broad authorization for electronic acknowledgement, verification, and sworn statements. .  [We are waiting to see if this change will be made in the California UETA bill.]

* Add many consumer statutes to the list of exempt statutes.  [This change was made in the California UETA bill.]  Wide consultation with regulators, law enforcement, and consumer groups will be needed to develop that list in each state.  As discussed above, the list of exempt statutes should include statutes requiring separate signature or initialing, as well as mortgage foreclosure notices, repossession related notices, change‑of‑terms notices, (especially for any contract entered into other than electronically), utility shutoff warnings and notices, service of court papers in the absence of a stipulation, and other notices affecting legal rights.

Consumer protection law enforcement officials and consumer advocates in other  states should be able to seek and win the changes in UETA that the sponsors have already agreed to in California.  This should make it easier for to pursue the additional needed improvements. 

 

Why didn't the drafters of this uniform law include consumer protections?

Unfortunately, the drafters of this law did not see consumer protection as their job. The UETA drafters have argued that it merely facilitates electronic commerce without changing underlying substantive laws. They see it as merely procedural.  Consumer advocates and consumer law enforcers know, however, that procedural rules often affect substantive rights.  Permitting electronic delivery of consumer notices, contracts, and disclosures may undermine the effectiveness of the some existing consumer protection statutes. 

 

If it isn't good for consumers, why fix it?  Why not just stop it?

Electronic commerce is here, and consumer laws need to be evaluated for how well they address it.  In some cases, consumer laws need to catch up with electronic commerce so that new practices don't undermine existing protections.  UETA is a reasonable place to start that process.

Despite its problems, UETA is more balanced than many of the electronic record and electronic signature proposals that have been made in Congress.  Some of those proposals would simply substitute electronic records and signatures for written records and signatures without any exceptions.  Unlike those proposals, UETA contemplates that some statutes will be exempt, and it expressly preserves state law requirements for the formatting of records when those records are delivered electronically.  UETA also avoids formalistic definitions of assent and mechanical attribution rules that attribute messages to consumers who didn't send them‑weaknesses found in some other electronic commerce proposals.

With the addition of the pro‑consumer changes made in California and other strengthening amendments, UETA could become a statute that facilitates electronic commerce without harm to consumers.

 

Conclusion

Many key issues must be resolved before UETA can serve the purpose its sponsor has laid out for it‑to facilitate electronic commerce when both parties desire to deal electronically without creating new avenues for abuse of consumers.  Much work by is needed by law enforcement agencies, public and private consumer advocates, and state legislatures to meet that challenge.

A copy of the pro‑consumer amendments made in the  California UETA bill, plus proposed legislative language to implement the additional consumer protections described here can be found at www.consumersunion.org*******ADD when posted****.  For more information, please contact:

 

Gail Hillebrand

Consumers Union

West Coast Regional Office

1535 Mission St.

San Francisco, CA  94103


415-431-6747 (phone)

415-431-0906 (fax)

hillga@consumer.org

 

The full text of UETA, with official commentary, can be downloaded from:

http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc_frame.htm

 

The above address will take you to the NCCUSL Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts Official Site page.  Click on the Final Acts link, which will take you to the NCCUSL Final Acts page.  Scroll through the Index on this page and choose the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act link, which will take you to the UETA Final Draft link at the bottom of the page.

 

The full text of the California's UETA bill, SB 820, can be found at: http://www.sen.ca.gov/htbin/testbin/ca.html?GOPHER_ROOT2:[BILL.CURRENT.SB.FROM0800.SB0820]CURRVER.TXT;1/bill/SB820

 

 

Prepared by:     Gail Hillebrand

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.

West Coast Regional Office

1535 Mission St.

San Francisco, CA  94103

August 1999

 


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