Written
Testimony to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
regarding the
Federal
Housing Administration Loan Program
June
4, 1998
Margot Saunders,
Gary Klein and
Elizabeth Renuart
National Consumer Law Center,
1629 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 986-6060
and the
Consumer
Federation of America
1424 16th Street, N.W.,
Suite 604
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 387-6121
Mr.
Chairman and Members of the Committee, the National Consumer Law Center1submits
the following written testimony today on behalf of
our low income clients and the Consumer Federation of America2 regarding
the FHA loan program.
We
oppose the Administrations's proposal to raise the Federal Housing Administration's
single family loan limit to $227,150. Our concern is that by raising the
loan limits, and thereby expanding the availability of FHA-insured mortgages
loans, the high rates of defaults and foreclosures currently experienced
by homeowners in this program will continue unabated. We would prefer to
see FHA improve its performance on loss mitigation and foreclosure prevention
on existing defaults, rather than paper over the problem of high
default rates by lending larger amounts to comparatively affluent borrowers.
We also have grave concerns with the Administration's proposal to allow
sales of defaulted loan to private lenders without FHA protections.
However,
it is essential that the committee understand that both the National Consumer
Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America fully support the FHA
loan program.The FHA loan program is an indispensable provider
of homeownership opportunities to low‑income and minority borrowers. The weaknesses in the FHA program should be addressed, however,
before the loan limits are expanded.
FHA
must institute a more effective foreclosure avoidance program. In
1997, over 71,000 families lost their government insured FHA homes. Only
about 700 households who were
in default on their FHA mortgages were able to avoid losing their homes
as the result of FHA's loss mitigation program.3 FHA's
loss mitigation techniques, as currently implemented, are not, by themselves,
sufficient to avoid foreclosure for most FHA homeowners that experience
financial problems.
The
FHA program was created to facilitate the dream of homeownership for low‑income,
and minority borrowers with comparatively small down payments. By definition, FHA
borrowers have fewer resources than others, and thus are considerably more
vulnerable to foreclosure when personal disaster strikes. The loss of a job,
divorce, illness or disability can all cause a
decrease in income -- through no fault of the borrower -- that can lead to
default. Since many FHA borrowers have relatively thin margins of income
over debt and limited savings, they have more difficulty than non-FHA borrowers
to develop a plan to resolve defaults.
For
this reason, foreclosure avoidance relief has been an integral part of the
FHA program for decades. We
recommend that FHA use a greater portion of FHA
insurance premiums to save the homes of homeowners facing temporary loss
of income, in order to avoid the massive financial loss that FHA would otherwise
face from foreclosure. After
all, it does not make sense to create a government program to facilitate
homeownership without providing an effective safety
net to make sure that homeownership can be sustained during periods of temporary
financial difficulty.
The
consequences of foreclosure are devastating for all parties. Families
not only lose their shelter but the pressures may result in a break-up of
the family. For elders, it can
result in an unnecessary transition to a more restricted living arrangement. Some
foreclosures lead to homelessness and others result in critical overcrowding
when ex‑homeowners move in with relatives. The
education of children often is disrupted due to missing or changing schools. Accumulated
equity is lost, credit is impaired,
and the family must pay moving expenses.
For
the FHA, the fund suffers an estimated $30,000 loss per foreclosure. In
1997, this totaled approximately $2.1 billion.4 For
communities, foreclosures contribute to the overall deterioration of a neighborhood,
to property abandonment, to the loss of community cohesiveness, to vandalism
and other crime, to the reduction
in property value and a resulting loss in the tax base.
The
loss mitigation program that FHA has instituted since the mortgage assignment
program was terminated in 1996 is not meeting the needs of the vast majority
of homeowners who default. According to statistics provided by FHA officials,
compared to the 71,000 foreclosures in 1997, only
the following homes were saved through loss mitigation techniques:
584 - Special
Forbearance
78 - Loan
Modifications
111 - Partial
Claims
Total - 773 homes
saved for FHA homeowners
FHA
also points to 4,429 pre-foreclosure sales as evidence that the loss
mitigation tools were effective. Although these pre-foreclosure sales save
the FHA fund money, they do not enable homeowners to keep their homes. Pre-foreclosure
sales are not evidence of a successful foreclosure avoidance program
for the homeowner since families are forced, often as a last resort, to give
up their home without anything to show in return. (By
definition, a pre-foreclosure sale is for a price which is less than the
amount owed on the loan. There
is no return to the homeowner.)
FHA
projects that at least 10,000 homeowners will avoid foreclosure in 1998 through
the use of the loss mitigation efforts.5 This
number includes both homeowners who give up the home prior to foreclosure
through a pre‑foreclosure sale as well as those who actually keep their
homes.6 But
even this total is only 14% of the total number of foreclosures in 1997 and
likely even a smaller percentage of the total number of homeowners who will
default in 1998. The goal of FHA’s foreclosures avoidance mechanism
must be to maintain homeownership.
FHA
only requires that the lender "consider" either loss mitigation
tools7or foreclosure.8 Thus,
there is no requirement that a lender seriously assess any home‑saving
options. FHA employs an
incentive approach to encouraging lenders to try one of the workout options. The
carrots include cash payments, but
the amount of these payments are small. And
payments are significantly higher for sale options than for the home-saving
plans.9 Moreover,
because lenders’ losses are almost completely reimbursed after foreclosure,
there are no penalties to lenders for failing to employ effective foreclosure
avoidance tools.
The
National Consumer Law Center has partnered with FHA to endeavor to make the
loss mitigation program a success. Through a contract with FHA, in late 1997
and early 1998, we provided training to over 600 housing counselors around
the nation on the specifics of FHA’s loss mitigation regulations. These counselors
work directly with the FHA homeowners facing foreclosure on a daily basis
and advocate to the lenders on behalf of homeowners.
However,
even after the training, the housing counselors had a host of serious concerns
with the current FHA loss mitigation requirements. The counselors, with few
exceptions reported that
Lenders
do not understand the loss mitigation program.
Few
lenders have utilized special forbearance, loan modification, and partial
claims to avoid foreclosure. Pre-foreclosure sales are being utilized,
and in some cases, counselors report that it is the only option the lender
is considering; some report homeowners are "pressured" to do
this.
Lenders’ behavior
are causing many more homeowners then in the past to lose their homes. Some
lenders do not even respond to professionally developed foreclosure avoidance
proposals. Others feel that
it is simply easier to foreclose and make a claim on the insurance pool.
We
stand ready to continue the process of improving and facilitating the loss
mitigation program. However, FHA’s incentive approach alone is not adequate
to stem the enormous tide of foreclosures. This
system needs to be improved.
Recommendations
To Improve FHA’s Loss Mitigation Program
Before
the FHA program is expanded with higher loan limits, the problems with the
foreclosure avoidance tools should be addressed. The following changes to
the Loss Mitigation Program would considerably improve its effectiveness,
and remedy a significant and serious problem with the FHA program. FHA should
mandate the use of specific loss mitigation tools. This can be accomplished
in a variety of ways:
Lenders
and servicers must be required to evaluate first the loss mitigation
options designed to save the home. Pre-foreclosure
sales and other options which require the homeowner to move should be
considered only after all other options have failed.
FHA
should require that servicers respond to a homeowner’s workout plan within
ten days of receipt. Any denial of a proposed plan should be made
in writing and include the reasons for the decision.
Homeowners
must be able to raise the claim that the lender improperly
foreclosed when a loss mitigation
plan was unreasonably rejected by the lender or servicer.
FHA
should deny claims on the fund from lenders when lenders have refused
to consider reasonable loss mitigation alternatives with appropriate
documentation.
The
partial claim program should be expanded. The first step a lender should
consider is eligibility for a partial claim payment from FHA which would
help the homeowners get caught up on missed payments when there is temporary
financial hardship. As in the current program, the FHA can protect
itself for any sum advanced by taking a junior mortgage.
The
criteria for eligibility should include loss of income due to circumstances
beyond the homeowner's control, and a reasonable
likelihood that the homeowner can begin making the full monthly mortgage
payment within a foreseeable period of time not
to exceed 24 months. FHA should pay the lender the mortgage payments
for the allotted time period. Then, in considerable contrast to the assignment
program, the amount paid by FHA should become a second, interest‑free
mortgage on the home payable only when the FHA mortgage is paid off or
the house is sold. The lender should be required to provide
homeowners with notice of the opportunity to apply for the partial claim
within
3 months of default. Written reasons should be required before the lender
rejects partial claims, and the homeowner should have the opportunity
to appeal to FHA. If rejected, the homeowner should still be able to
propose one of the other home-saving options which the lender must review.
The
current loss mitigation tool of special forbearance is rarely utilized,
due to the GNMA requirement that the servicer forward a full payment
to GNMA regardless of what the servicer collects. Understandably
a complex issue, but we recommend two possible solutions:
a.
GNMA or FHA should set up a reserve fund to avoid this requirement.
b.
FHA should provide a larger incentive for special forbearance in recognition
of the lender’s obligation to GNMA.
GNMA’s
requirement that a servicer provide five loans of similar interest rate
and term in a package of re-pooled modified mortgages is an impediment
to servicers utilizing this tool. Loan
modifications are a good remedy for many defaulted borrowers and many
miss this opportunity. FHA
staff or an outside contractor might serve as "re-packager" for
loans from servicers which do not have sufficient volume.
Funding
for housing counselors should be increased. The
entire system benefits when well trained counselors work with unsophisticated homeowners
to develop a realistic budget and communicate viable proposals to lenders. Yet,
these non-profit organizations are woefully underfunded.
Create
and publicize a hotline for consumers and counselors to report lenders
whose conduct contributes to unnecessary foreclosures. The
hotline could provide an ombudsperson function to assist homeowners in
default. Additional monitoring
of servicers implementing loss mitigation plans should also be pursued.
Concerns with FHA Sales
of Defaulted Notes. The
Administration has proposed as an income-producing measure that prior to
foreclosure FHA be allowed
to sell defaulted notes at discounted rates to private lenders. The lenders
would take the notes, for which they paid less than the face value, and
still have first place security in the home worth more than the value of
the new note. The homeowner would have no FHA protections applicable.
No loss mitigation requirements would apply whatsoever.
We
know from experience with the
FHA sale of other loan notes
that the first thing the new lender does is pressure the homeowner into signing
a new, high interest rate loan. These new loans will often be at high rates
with high points and fees. Homeowners facing the foreclosure of their homes
will often grab at any straws offered them, no matter how costly and unlikely
to provide real relief these straws turn out to be. The purchasing lenders
have a ripe opportunity to take advantage of desperate homeowners who have
little or no equity due to loan arrearages.
Learn
From Experience. In 1995
HUD sold over 68,000 mortgage loans acquired through the FHA assignment
and other programs. The majority of the homeowners whose notes were sold
were low-income. The aggressive collection activities of those lenders
who purchased the loans from HUD created substantial confusion, anxiety,
and cost to these homeowners. According to the allegations of a class action
recently certified in the Federal Court in Maryland, immediately following
the HUD sale of the notes, one lender sent homeowners notices of intent
to foreclose despite the fact that they were current under forbearance
agreements with HUD.10 Additionally,
this lender allegedly sent the homeowners additional notices to foreclose
and refused to accept payments from homeowners. The homeowners became anxious
and believing that foreclosure was imminent, they refinanced with the lender,
paying high closing costs and fees.11
The
proposal to sell loans in default is especially flawed. It proposes to allow
a massive transfer of assets from the poorest homeowners facing financial
disaster ‑‑FHA homeowners in default ‑‑to private
industry. FHA homeowners have paid their FHA premiums. They deserve some
special protections in return for these premiums. The sale of their notes
after default to a lender who is not required to abide by any protections
would represent a serious departure from the promise of some protections
after default. The proposal should be rejected.
Conclusion
The
FHA program is an invaluable means of increasing homeownership in the United
States for families with otherwise limited opportunities. However,
until the flaws in the existing foreclosure prevention process are rectified,
the program should not be enlarged by increasing the loan limits.
1 The
National Consumer Law Center, Inc. (NCLC) is a nonprofit Massachusetts
corporation founded in 1969 at Boston College School of Law and dedicated
to the interests of low‑income consumers. NCLC
provides legal and technical consulting and assistance on consumer
law issues to legal services, government and private attorneys across
the country. Cost of Credit (NCLC 1995), Truth in Lending (NCLC
1996) and Repossessions and Foreclosures (NCLC
1996) are three of twelve practice treatises published and annually
supplemented by NCLCwhichdescribe the law currently
applicable to all types of consumer loan transactions. As
a result of our daily contact with practicing attorneys, we have seen
examples of foreclosure problems for low‑income
families in almost every state in the union. It
is from this vantage point‑‑many years of dealing with
the abusive transactions thrust upon the less sophisticated and less
powerful in our communities‑‑that we supply this testimony
today.
2 The Consumer Federation of America
is a nonprofit association of some 250 consumer groups, with a combined
membership of 50 million people. CFA was founded in 1968 to advance
consumers' interests through advocacy and education.
3 This information was obtained from
a declaration of Emelda Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single
Family Housing, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, in
the case of Ferrell v. U.S. Dept. Of FHA , U.S. District Court,
Case No. 73 C 334, E.D.Ill.
4 This
number is the result of multiplying $30,000 by 71,000 foreclosures.
6 The FHA will not know until the
end of this year, how many of these homeowners will actually
maintain their home, or which will only avoid foreclosure through pre‑foreclosure
sales.
7 The
workout options available to lenders that are designed to save the
home include: special forbearance, partial claim, and loan modification/refinancing. The
options that result in a loss of the home but save the FHA a loss as
high as that which results from foreclosure are: deed transfer in lieu
of foreclosure, pre‑foreclosure sales, assumptions.
9 For
example, the FHA will pay lenders $100 for each special forbearance,
up to $250 for costs for each partial claim, $500 for each loan modification. On
the other hand, lenders receive $1,000 for each pre‑foreclosure
sale and up to $500 for costs for each "deed in lieu" (which
is when a homeowner voluntarily provides a deed to the house in return
for release of all liability). The
amount paid for each special forbearance increases to $200 if the lender
scores in the top 25% on a lender performance scoring system devised
by the FHA.
10 Peoples
v. Wendover Funding, Inc. No.
k‑97‑158 (D.Md. filed 1/17/97).
11 HUD
sold these loans for 74 to 91 percent of the outstanding principal
balance. This means that the profit margin for investors is very high
if homeowners refinance and pay the entire amount due, that is the
unpaid principal plus the assignment arrears.