Testimony before
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology regarding
the
Impact of P.L. 104-134 ("EFT-99")
On the Poor, the Elderly and the "Unbanked"
June 18, 1997
Presented by Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, also on behalf of the Consumer
Federation of America, National Coalition of Community Reinvestment Coalitions,
and Organization For A New Equality
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the National Consumer
Law Center(1) thanks you for inviting us to testify
today regarding the implications of EFT-99 to the unbanked recipients of federal
payments. We offer our testimony here today on behalf of our low income clients,
as well as the Consumer Federation of America,(3)
the National Community Reinvestment Coalition,(4)
and the Organization for A New Equality.(5) This
is an issue in which we are all vitally interested. There is significant potential
for negative impact on low income elderly and disabled people throughout the
U.S. which would result from the improper implementation of the new law.
There are numerous issues which will affect the unbanked recipients of federal
benefits. One is the extent to which Treasury forces the "unbanked"
to use accounts which cost them too much money to access. Another, just as important
issue is which kind of institution - regulated and insured, or unregulated
- Treasury authorizes to be the providers of the federal payments to federal
payees. This issue is important, not only because of the fees which would be
charged by the alternative financial providers, but because of all of the other
services that these providers would market to the poor. A third issue is
how Treasury defines the "hardship" exemption under the statute. If
defined appropriately, those federal recipients who cannot find appropriately
priced accounts would be allowed to continue receiving paper checks. (Criteria
included in the hardship standard should also include reasonable and safe access
and consideration of disabilities).
The crux of the problem here is that Treasury says that the banks don't want
the accounts of the "unbanked" and that the only way to convince the
banks to provide these services is to allow them to charge fees for the services.
In fact, it is too early to know the answer. Treasury does not know how much
it will cost to provide these accounts. Treasury does not know how much benefit
the banks may derive from providing these accounts - in terms of float on the
funds in the accounts, and sale of other banking services to these new customers.
There is considerable confusion over the reasons why there are so many people
outside the banking system in the U.S.(6) The
significant discrepancies in the information currently available is a clear
indication that more information should be gathered before drastic and expensive
changes in the delivery system for federal payments are made.(7)
While banks are publically hesitating to embrace the unbanked as a new source
of customers, other financial providers -- such as check cashers and finance
companies -- are chafing at the bit to be allowed to dispense these services.
However, consumer and community advocates are united in their belief that
allowing alternative financial providers to be the conduits for federal payments
will be expensive and harmful to federal recipients and their communities.
It is the task of Treasury, and of Congress, to figure out how to deliver federal
benefits to the unbanked in the United States so as to improve the
lives of the recipients, not make them harder.
Treasury has estimated that it will save approximately one hundred million dollars
per year by the electronic deposit of all federal funds.(8)
Most of these savings will flow from the direct deposit of federal payments
into existing bank accounts. EFT-99 (as Treasury has dubbed the requirements
of P.S. 104-134) offers significant opportunities to bring low income people
into the mainstream banking system. Consumer and community advocates welcome
this chance to facilitate the relationship between the poor and the banks. Savings
efforts would be fostered and loan terms improved. Credit provided by banks
is generally on much more reasonable terms than that provided by alternative
financial providers - fringe bankers. However, these new relationships between
banks and low income federal recipients should not cost too much; nor should
they be cause of further problems in the low income community. Treasury should
use some of the initial savings realized from the electronic deposits to encourage
and pay for the initial establishment of truly low cost accounts for the "unbanked."
The balance of this testimony will be in four parts:
1) The financial burden of ATM and POS fees on low income elderly and disabled
federal recipients.
2) The importance to individuals and low-income communities of ensuring
that alternative financial providers are not the conduits of payments to federal
recipients.
3) The appropriate definition for the "Hardship" exemption under the
statute which would allow a waiver of the requirement for electronic deposit.
"Hardship" should include those individuals who do not have access
to accounts at financial institutions with a reasonable fee structure, reasonable
means of access and other basic terms. "Hardship" should also include
recipients' mental or physical disabilities which prevent the feasible access
to their funds, as well as recipients who are unable for a variety of other
reasons to use electronic banking.
4) Recommendations for Congressional action to deal with these concerns.
Part 1
The Financial Burden of ATM and POS Fees on
Low Income
Elderly and Disabled Federal Recipients.
There are potentially three types of fees that could be charged
federal recipients of electronic payments: (1) a monthly service charge by the
assigned bank; (2) a charge from the assigned bank for accessing their benefits;
and (3) a surcharge fee if they go to another bank's ATM. However, this is not
the limit on all of the types of fees that could be charged. As the amount of
most federal payments are not in neat $5 or $10 increments, such that ATM machines
would be able to dispense the entire monthly allotment in one withdrawal, at
least some POS (point of sale) device withdrawals will also be required. Although,
currently few retailers impose POS access fees, there is nothing to prohibit
the imposition of such fees when POS usage becomes more widespread.
Further, because of the interest income that banks can make on the federal payment
held in the accounts, it would make business sense for institutions to encourage
more withdrawals during the month, rather than fewer - thus rewarding
recipients for leaving some funds in the account (and encouraging recipients
in their savings' efforts). Also, it is likely that the unbanked will recognize
the safety and convenience of leaving funds in the accounts, for gradual withdrawal
as need arises during the month. So, it is not unreasonable to imagine a scenario
in which the following, seemingly reasonable, incremental fees would be charged
to a federal recipient in one of these accounts:(9)
Monthly service charge by the assigned bank -- $3.50
Charge from the assigned bank for accessing benefits ($1.00
x 3)(10) -- 3.00
Surcharge fee for use of another bank's ATM ($1.50
x 2)(11) -- 3.00
POS fees ($1.50 x 3) -- 4.50
TOTAL monthly expenditure accessing federal payments -- $14.00
Now, consider the burden this amount imposes on an elderly or disabled individual(12)
subsisting entirely on Supplemental Security Income (SSI).(13)
Currently the federal payment to an SSI recipient living alone is $484 a month.(14)
This means that this low income federal recipient would spend 2.9% of their
income every month just accessing the federal payment to which they are by law
entitled. The burden could easily be more, as the incremental fees used in this
example are each fairly low.
Some may say that these charges are not excessive when compared to the amounts
that many of the unbanked currently pay to have their federal payments cashed.
Indeed if the unbanked recipient is now using a check cashier on a regular basis,
it is likely that a single transaction of cashing the federal check would be
in excess of these $14 monthly fees.(15) And,
it must be recognized that the individual who uses the ATM card to withdraw
funds in increments during the month enjoys additional safety and convenience
features that are not available when a check cashier is used. However, it is
not reasonable to assume that all unbanked recipients of federal payments
use check cashers to cash their federal checks. It is much more likely that
the majority of these unbanked use one of the following no cost alternatives:
cash their check at a bank at which they do not have an account;
cash their check at a grocery store or other neighborhood
store;
deposit their check in a relative's account;
have a relative cash their check for them.
In fact, a recent Treasury survey on the characteristics of
Federal Benefit Check Recipients,(16) found
that 58% of federal benefit recipients without a bank account nonetheless have
their federal checks cashed at a bank, 25% use a grocery store or other retailer
for check cashing purposes, and a mere 8% of unbanked federal recipients regularly
used check cashing outlets. (17)
The impact of the combination of numerous fees imposed to access electronically
deposited federal payments on low income recipients will be equivalent to a
reduction of their federal entitlement. Those in poverty will suffer. This potential
financial burden on America's poorest underscores the importance of Congress
and Treasury' ensuring that the actual fees charged - if any - are appropriate
and truly necessary.
Part 2
The Importance to Individuals and Low and
Moderate Income Communities of Ensuring That Alternative Financial Providers
Are Not the Conduits of Payments to Federal Recipients.
Treasury is contemplating allowing providers of
financial services other than regulated depository institutions to be conduits
of federal benefits. Such a result would be terrible for low income recipients
of federal payments and their communities. If alternative providers of financial
services are permitted to be conduits of federal payments, that would constitute
the federal government's blessing of grossly abusive practices against low-income
and elderly people. Moreover, it would actually force the unbanked into relationships
with these unregulated financial providers that to date they have generally
been able to avoid. As the Treasury's own study indicates, the overwhelming
majority of the unbanked federal recipients cash their federal checks at banks
or stores,(18) generally --if not always --
without any fees being paid to access their federal money whatsoever.
Treasury could allow alternative providers of financial services to be the conduits
in two ways: 1) The term "authorized agent"(19)
in the statute could be interpreted to allow an alternative financial provider
to be designated the recipient of federal payments instead of a financial institution
(defined by Treasury to be a bank, savings institution or credit union)(20);
or 2) Treasury could permit financial institutions to contract with alternative
providers as its delivery mechanism for EFT payments to the otherwise "unbanked."
Fringe bankers, such as check cashers, finance companies, and others, do business
in the low income community because of the large profits that they can make.
Expensive services, extraordinarily high fees, and abusive transaction terms
are standard business practices for these alternative providers. They have succeeded
because of the vacuum created by the absence of banks from these communities.
These fringe bankers make no reinvestment of their substantial profits back
into the communities. They charge as much for financial services as the regulatory
structure - or lack of regulation - allows. And the low income residents of
the community gain little benefit other than the specific service provided from
their presence. If this non-regulated industry - which continues without CRA
obligations - is allowed to be the conduit of federal payments, the financial
problems in the low income communities will not only continue to be ignored,
they will be exacerbated.
Treasury's use of alternative financial providers as conduits for the federal
payments will be the U.S. imprimatur on the unregulated activities of these
alternative providers. The government will be saying, in effect, that the federally
insured and regulated banking system is only for those who can afford it. The
poor would be required by the government to use alternative, unregulated providers
with none of the benefits and protections furnished to consumers in the financial
mainstream. Such a result should not be the consequence of this legislation.
Consumer and community advocates fear the use of alternative financial providers
as conduits largely because of the other services that will undoubtedly
be sold to the recipients. If recipients must go through the doors of the fringe
bankers at least one time each month, it is very likely that they will fall
prey to the expensive -- and unregulated -- other financial products of these
fringe bankers, such as check cashing,(21) payday
loans,(22) high cost home equity loans, even
rent-to-own transactions. While recipients may always be able to opt for these
services if they care to, they should not be required to go through the doors
of these alternative providers every single month in order to obtain their federal
entitlement.
Treasury's use of "authorized agents" as alternative conduits of federal
payments should be limited to those individuals and entities who have a fiduciary
duty to the recipient. The words "other authorized agents" in the
new law are only intended to apply to the types of recognized surrogates that
are currently used as intermediaries for the receipt of benefits through the
various federal programs, when the actual recipient cannot, for some reason,
be the original designee of the federal payment. For example, the Social Security
Act uses the term "representative payee," various Veterans programs
use the term "fiduciary agent;" and other federal payees may use guardians
or attorneys in fact. The new statute simply uses the term "other authorized
agent" as a pseudonym for all of these terms, as it would have been illogical
to attempt to separately identify every type of individual agent currently used
under both federal and state law as an intermediary for the receipt of federal
payments. However, the consistent aspect among all of the types of agents currently
recognized by state or federal law is the fiduciary duty that is owed to the
recipient. Treasury should not go beyond this by allowing agents to be conduits
of federal payments who do not have a fiduciary duty to the recipients.
Very Limited Regulation on Check Cashers. Check cashers are NOT the appropriate
alternative to banks to provide access to federal payments for the "unbanked."
In only eleven states, plus the District of Columbia, are there even limits
on the amounts that check cashers can charge to cash government checks. Examples
of caps on check cashing fees in the few states that have limits are:
California: 3 to 3.5% for government and payroll checks, depending upon identification.
Connecticut: 1% for state welfare checks, 2% for others.
Delaware: 2% or $4, whichever is larger, for all checks.
D.C.: 1% or 50 cents whichever is greater.
Georgia: The larger of $5 or 3% for welfare checks, 5% for payroll
checks, and 10% for personal checks.
Illinois: 1.4% to 1.85% plus an additional 90-cent-per-check
charge.
Indiana: $5.00 or 10% of the face amount of the check, whichever
is greater.
Minnesota: 2.5% of welfare checks over $500 (5% for the first
check), 3% of other government and payroll checks (6% for the first check);
no limit on personal checks (but rates must be filed and "reasonable").
New Jersey: 1% on New Jersey checks, 1.5% on others, or $.50,
whichever is larger.
New York: 1.1% of the face amount or $.60, whichever is larger.
Ohio: 3% on government checks.
Rhode Island: The larger of $5 or 3% for welfare checks, 5%
for payroll checks.
While some of these fee ceilings may themselves seem high, in the rest of the
38 states, there are no limits whatsoever on these fringe bankers.
For once, let us learn from experience. The experience in the low-income communities
around the nation is that fringe bankers have developed sophisticated and ingenious
techniques for taking money from the poor. Fringe bankers--check cashers, finance
companies, and others--should not be provided a government boost to their business
by serving either as "other authorized agents," or contractors with
financial institutions for the delivery of federal payments. Commercial banks,
savings banks, credit unions, and possibly the U.S. Postal Service, should be
the only designees for receipt of electronic transfers of federal payments.
"Fringe banking" is an entire industry devoted to doing business in
the low-income community, which has proliferated largely as a result of the
deregulation of interest rates and loan terms in many states since the 1980's.
Lawyers who represent poor people can document--in almost every state--high
cost lending, both illegal under state usury laws, as well as legal under a
deregulated environment. Many of these providers constantly push the envelope
in terms of the legality of their practices--they keep charging the exorbitant
fees until made to stop. All too often, the abusive practices are not technically
illegal, but exceed the bounds of common decency.(23)
Establishing any one of the purveyors of this high cost credit as the conduit
of federal payments sanctions and stimulates these types of transactions. The
federal government should be in the business of discouraging high cost lending,
not providing the means to facilitate it.
Substantive limitations on fees and terms governing the contracts between the
recipients of federal payments and the authorized agents would NOT provide sufficient
protections from the problems that would be created by allowing fringe bankers
to be authorized agents. The federal payment would simply ensure that the recipient
becomes a captive customer of that fringe banker, without even the present opportunities
to go elsewhere if treated unfairly. Fringe bankers, generally speaking, should
not be supported by the federal government. Appendix A provides examples of
some of the abusive charges made by fringe bankers.
Justifications for Fringe Bankers - Not Sufficient. Some Treasury staff have
said that check cashers and money transmitters should be considered for three
reasons: 1) they seem to be the financial providers of choice to many of the
unbanked; 2) they may offer services (such as electronic payment of bills) to
many low income people that may not otherwise be accessible; and 3) they have
a wide array of outlets in the community already which should be deployed to
provide residents more access. Even if these statements were true -- although
Treasury's own research calls them into serious doubt -- they are nevertheless
not sufficient justification for making the fringe bankers "authorized
agents" for the receipt of federal funds.
There are several reasons that some low income people choose to use check cashers
rather than banks. Very often, low income people cannot afford to use banks:
they cannot afford the fees or minimum balances required for accounts. Presumably
the proper design of Direct Deposit Too(24)
accounts will remedy the financial aspect of this issue. However, as noted previously
many low income people do not use banks even when affordable accounts are offered
because of privacy concerns, fears of having their funds attached by creditors,
or just because banks are not as comfortable to them as the local check casher
or retailer who provides free or low cost check cashing services to its customers.
Reassurances of privacy and of the anti-attachment prohibitions for Social Security
funds should address the first two aspects of this concern. The last aspect
- the level of comfort - can be addressed by simply allowing check cashers to
continue providing their services in the community as they do currently.
We do not propose that fringe bankers be prohibiting from providing any access
to federal money, just not the sole access for any federal recipient.
Nothing requires that check cashers could not establish ATM or POS devices on
their premises and sell recipients all of the products and services that are
now currently offered. The key distinctions between this and allowing alternative
financial providers to be "authorized agents" or contractors with
financial institutions for the delivery of federal electronic payments are:
1) If recipients can only receive their federal payments through "financial
institutions" as currently defined by Treasury, they will be pulled into
the mainstream banking system, and thus provided savings' opportunities as well
as alternative (and less expensive) sources for credit.
2) Recipients who must have a bank account, but who nevertheless choose to access
their money through a check cashier or a money transmitter, will still have
the choice every month of where to obtain their funds-- they would not have
to go to the check cashers to receive their federal payments.
3) The banks receiving the federal payments will have a greater source of funds
as a basis for community reinvestment back into the low income community, whereas
the check cashier has no such obligation.
Access should not be the criteria to allow alternative financial providers to
be the conduits of federal payments. Social service agencies in the community
can quite easily facilitate access. The agencies can help recipients initially
establish accounts with various banks that have electronic equipment or branches
in the community. The social service workers can help recipients determine which
accounts best serve their individual needs by interpreting the features and
the costs of the available choices. Further, the workers can help recipients
learn about accessing funds electronically by conducting trainings, providing
reading materials on the new law and its requirements, and helping recipients
master the use of personal identification numbers (PINs), ATMs and POS devices.
Finally, the social service agencies can help recipients use banks' customer
assistance telephone lines to answer questions about withdrawals, charges, and
other issues.
The Use of Default Banks Provides Treasury With Tremendous Leverage To Expand
Services in Low Income Communities. What happens to all the payments to federal
recipients who fail to tell their federal payer into which bank their deposits
should be placed? It is unlikely that paper checks will still be sent. Instead,
the funds will be transferred electronically to some bank. The recipients will
then have to obtain their funds from that bank, either electronically or through
a teller. Treasury will have the choice of using either a federal Electronic
Benefits Transfer system -- one bank nationwide, with minimal services, and
minimal access -- or a series of default banks in each state or region.
If Treasury chooses to go the route of using default banks, the leverage available
is immense. Consider the potential amount of money involved in just one state,
that would flow through the default bank, that is not now being deposited in
that bank. On a state by state basis, the monthly deposits will be increased
by hundreds of millions of dollars.(25) The
float on this money, even if it is all withdrawn within a few days of deposit
by the Treasury, will be substantial. It therefore seems reasonable to assume
that many banks will recognize the profit potential of being a default bank
for all of the unbanked recipients in the state or region and that there will
be competition for this opportunity on a national, state, or local level.
Treasury can use the leverage provided by the competition between financial
institutions to be the default bank to ensure that additional ATM and POS devices
are available at reasonable access points throughout the low income communities.
Treasury can also use the combination of these many relatively small accounts
to provide economies of scale. In this way, the combination of many accounts
should keep the monthly and transaction fees to a minimum, while still providing
the financial institution with a healthy profit for engaging in this new business.
Additionally, the default banks will have a ready source of new customers to
whom to market all of their other products and services.
Part 3
The "Hardship" Exemption Allowing
a Waiver of the Electronic Deposit Requirement.
As advocates of low-income consumers, we basically agree
that electronic transfers are a more efficient and safer method of receiving
payments than the paper based system. However, the additional advantages of
the electronic system quickly evaporate if recipients have higher costs, unanticipated
risks, and/or greater potential losses. Assuming that financial institutions
respond to this opportunity to market their business to an entire new segment
of the communities, there are a range of options that could be pursued. Banks
could aggressively market existing low cost checking or savings accounts.
They could create all electronic accounts, as are contemplated under Direct
Deposit Too", with access only through use of an ATM card. Or, wholly
new types of accounts and combinations of attributes might be designed.
We hope as much as Treasury that the banking community will
recognize the huge potential for new customers in EFT-99, and begin the process
of designing new accounts which would meet the needs of the unbanked, while
providing fertile new markets for a variety of banking services. However, we
are less sanguine regarding this actually happening. First, this has not happened
to date.(26) Although the federal government
and the unbanked have a new reason for needing the banking community to respond,
the banks may not react as desired by marketing services to this population,
as they clearly have not done to date. Further, many of the larger banks have
already recognized the tremendous money making potential in this market and
have created non-banking subsidiaries to provide services which are priced considerably
more expensively than the same services provided to their own customers. A number
of finance companies and check cashers are subsidiaries of banks.(27)
In many cases, the ultimate ownership of the fringe banker does not seem to
change its standard practices.
If consumer advocates are overly pessimistic, we will be thrilled to find ourselves
wrong. However, if we are correct, then it will fall back to the federal government
to either (1) reduce its expectations for the pervasive use of electronic transfers
(because too many of the unbanked will remain unbanked, and thus not have electronic
transfers realistically available to them); (2) provide some incentives to banks
for providing these electronic transfer services to the unbanked; or (3) compromise
the standards of the accounts to be furnished to the unbanked, and require this
population to be serviced in a manner which does not adequately protect them
from abuses. Option 3 should be avoided at all costs, as whether or not one
believes that it is the government's responsibility to protect the neediest
of its citizens from harm, everyone should agree that it is NOT in the government's
purview to advance that harm upon the neediest of its citizens. Requiring the
unbanked to use fringe bankers to access their federal payments, or requiring
them to use accounts at financial institutions which do not include certain
minimum standards would create new opportunities for the neediest segment
of the federal payee population to be harmed. This is an unacceptable choice.
Essential protections for electronic transfers include a myriad of considerations.
We propose that the minimum attributes of a required electronic account for
the receipt of federal payments meet these criteria. Any federal payee who cannot
find an account at an insured, depository institution should be considered to
have a hardship under the statute, such that their federal payment would continue
to be made by paper check.(28) After all, although
as a policy matter we can all agree that receipt of payments electronically
is generally better for all concerned, that will not apply to each individual.
This is the basic rationale behind the statute's exception to the requirement
for electronic transfers in cases of hardship. When high costs, excessive risks
and/or difficulties in accessing the payment are involved for a particular individual
the electronic option may be far worse than the paper system.
Limits on monthly fees. Many recipients of federal benefit
payments, and especially those who are currently unbanked, live at or below
the federal poverty guidelines. For example, one of the criteria for receipt
of SSI payments is meeting an income eligibility test. Very few of these precious
dollars should be required to be spent on fees for the mandated electronic
account.
At a maximum, allowable fees should be the lesser
of 1% of the monthly payment or $3.00.
Reasonable access to cash withdrawals. Many people budget
on a weekly basis, so they should be permitted to withdraw needed cash on
a weekly basis. Moreover, it is to the institution's financial benefit to
encourage the recipient to leave some portion of the payment in the account,
as the account is not interest bearing and the institution benefits from the
float.
Reasonable access to cash withdrawals should include no fewer
than four free ATM withdrawals at the financial institution at which the account
is held per month, plus a reasonable number of ATM balance inquiries. In the
absence of ATM availability, the same general rules should apply to teller withdrawals.
Limits on fees for access to cash. Currently many financial
institutions charge as much as $2.50 to users of their ATMs who are not customers.
Recipients of direct federal benefits who have these limited electronic accounts
should not be charged any more than the actual costs to the financial institution
for processing the transaction.
Recipients who use the ATMs at the financial institution
where they have an account, on a more frequent basis than four times a month,
should be charged no more than the actual cost of the transaction to the financial
institution.
Prohibition on fees for point of sale transactions involving
a purchase. Both the merchant and the bank gain when payments are made electronically
when a sale of goods or services has taken place. The merchant receives payment
immediately, without the cost of having to count the cash, the worry of having
to collect on a check, or the expense of the merchants' discount when a credit
card is used. The bank similarly benefits. Further, the bank benefits because
it has the use of the recipient's money until the last possible moment. The
recipient of electronically dispensed federal payments should thus not be
charged for electronically paying for goods, when by doing so it benefits
everyone else in the transaction.
No fees or surcharges should be permitted for POS transactions
involving the purchase of goods or services.
Other access and consumer protections issues should also
be assured. Appendix B of this testimony sets out these other consumer protection
issues in more detail.
Part 4
Recommendations for Congressional Action
Congress should amend P. L. 104-134 in three ways:
1) Delay the implementation of the section of the law which requires electronic
deposit of federal payments to the "unbanked" to enable Treasury to
determine the actual costs and benefits to financial institutions derived from
providing direct deposit accounts to the unbanked recipients of federal payments.
2) Authorize Treasury to employ various means, including the use of some of
the savings derived from electronic deposits of federal funds to recipients
with bank accounts, to motivate financial institutions to provide the
"unbanked" with direct deposit accounts.
3) Ensure that only financial institutions with CRA obligations to the low income
communities, or credit unions, be the authorized conduits for federal electronic
payments.
Appendix A
Examples of Fringe Banking Charges
Establishing formal relationships between the recipient of federal
funds and fringe bankers, which are not easily discarded, is a dangerous support
for the activities of these fringe bankers. Limits on the fees and the terms
charged by the fringe bankers for the transfer of funds will not adequately
protect consumers. Even now, some fringe bankers provide free check cashing
as a means of enticing customers into their stores. Even rent-to-own dealers
are recognizing that check cashing provides a captive audience for its overpriced
services.(29) The free check cashing is simply
a loss leader for the overwhelmingly profitable rent to own transactions that
follow. The rental of the living room suite or a TV at a rental purchase store
is likely to cost the consumer an equivalent interest rate of well over 100%.(30)
One federal appellate court recently found "the public interest overwhelmingly
favors enjoining these contracts."(31)
Unfortunately for consumers, in most of the other 49 states equivalent judicial
decisions are not immediately likely. Is this a relationship that the federal
government should be fostering by allowing this type of financial services provider
to be a conduit for federal payments?
"Check cashing fees range from 1% of the check to a
very high 21% of the face amount of the check."(32)
There are only a handful of states that regulate the rates imposed by check
cashers. Allowable regulated fees are as high as 10% on personal checks (Georgia).
However, even in the few states where there are limits on check cashier's
fees, these restrictions are routinely ignored. In a study by the New Jersey
Public Advocate's Office on check cashing charges, 652 customers were surveyed.
49% of these customers were found to have been charged more than the maximum
legal rate--on average 44% over the legal rate.(33)
The check cashers' fees are not just exorbitant on small
checks. Consider one case in which $1,100 was charged on a lump sum Social
Security check for $11,000. The check cashier had deceptively told the recipient
that cashing the check would have been more expensive at a bank.(34)
In South Carolina, where until recently small loan rates
were completely deregulated, 100% was a typical posted interest rate charged
for small loans. Now, with some statutory limits, 56%-60% is a typical charge
for loans between $300 and $400. Higher rates, even for costlier loans, are
not uncommon. For example, 85% on a $1000 loan with a 1 year term was recently
made to one low-income consumer.
Check cashers are also making big bucks on people who have
checking accounts. "PayDay" Loans are the newest scheme. Lower income
wage earners, military personnel and welfare recipients are all typical customers.(35)
According to the Virginia Attorney General the following describes a typical
loan transaction:
Consumer customer visits Payday, completes application and writes
a present or post-dated check to Payday for $100. Payday provides customer with
$83 in cash that day and agrees to hold customer's check until an agreed upon
future date, generally corresponding with the consumer customer's payday. On
the agreed upon future date, Payday deposits and presents the consumer's check
for payment. During this process the consumer customer's check typically is
held for a period of between five to fifteen days." The effective annual
percentage rate actually charged on these PayDay loans ranges from 498% to 1,495%
if the check is held for only five days.
In Illinois, finance companies have also abused the deregulation
of small loan interest rates. In one case(36)consumers
were charged between 283% and 557% on loans in the range of $1000. Lender's
employees typically met customers as they left their places of employment;
threats of violence were implicit throughout the dealings.(37)
Some may argue that these examples are extreme, and not characteristic
of the fringe banking industry. We, who work with lawyers representing low-income
consumers on a daily basis, attest that these few examples are not isolated
incidents. How many examples would it take to prove a pattern of abusive behavior
by too many fringe-bankers throughout the United States?
Others may argue that there is nothing inherently wrong with
these charges, as everyone has choices and the consumers of these fringe bankers
are simply inappropriately exercising their freedom of choice. That may or may
not be. But the issue here is not whether to allow these industries to continue
to thrive, but whether the federal government should place its imprimatur on
these activities by establishing those responsible as the conduit for the access
to the federal payments by many low-income consumers.
Appendix B
Additional Consumer Protection Issues Related
to EFT-99 Accounts
Reasonable access to information about the balance left in
the account. Providing monthly statements--as otherwise required to consumers
under the EFTA--is a relatively expensive service which might reasonably be
waived for recipients of Direct Deposit Too accounts. However, that leaves
the necessity that recipients be entitled to find out, on a reasonable basis,
the remaining balance on their accounts, as well as the reason, the timing
and the amount of fees imposed. It seems reasonable to require that every
ATM transaction include the provision of a receipt which indicates the imposition
of fees, to the extent applicable, and the remaining balance in the account.
To the extent that further information is necessary, or recipients wish to
find out any of this information at other times, they should be able to call
a toll free number, provide appropriate identifying information and obtain
there account information. Whether or not this telephone service is available,
recipients should be able to obtain a transaction history upon request at
minimal or no cost.
At a minimum, all receipts from ATM transactions should include
information about the remaining balance and fees; at least two monthly ATM balance
inquiries should be allowed for free, and others should be charged no more than
the actual cost to the bank for providing the information; and a transaction
history should be available free upon request or whenever there is a dispute.
Application of the consumer protections (such as disclosure
of rights, protections from loss from unauthorized transfers, error resolution,
etc.) which are provided by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA,"
also referred to as "Reg E"). There should be no dispute about this
issue. Indeed, as the federal government will benefit from the provision of
electronic accounts to federal payees, it is the federal government which
should bear the risks of loss when the application of EFTA poses an additional
cost to the financial institution that it is unwilling to bear.
The EFTA should unconditionally apply to all Direct Deposit
Too and federally established EBT accounts.
Electronic access to benefits that is within a reasonable
distance to the recipient's home must be provided. Access based on distance
is generally a subjective matter. In a rural area, requiring an ATM or POS
within a mile from the recipient's home seems to be unrealistic and perhaps
unnecessary. However, given the expense (both financial and emotional for
some recipients) of urban transportation, as well as the degree of physical
handicap for many elderly or disabled recipients, access to benefits that
is even a mile away may be too far. The standard thus should remain subjective.
Recipients should be permitted to avoid the requirements
of electronic transfers if benefit access is not reasonably accessible from
their homes.
The ATM card or device must be accepted by a reasonable number
of merchants in the neighborhood and surrounding area. There are currently
a number of ATM networks--Cirrus, Honor, etc.--most of which are reasonably
accessible at merchants in the geographical area in which the banks offering
them are located. However, some networks are more popular in some areas than
others, and are thus less accessible in the "foreign" areas. If
access to cash benefits through ATMs is limited before fees are imposed, it
is important that POS access be reasonable. This means that there must be
a sufficient number of stores which both accept the type of ATM network device
provided in the geographic vicinity in which the federal payee lives and permit
the use of the card for cash back and withdrawals as well as purchases.
The ATM card or device must be accepted by a reasonable number
of merchants in the neighborhood and surrounding area who permit both free cash
back with purchase transactions and reasonably priced cash withdrawal options.
ATMs and POS devices must be accessible to handicapped people.
Many recipients of direct federal benefit payments are eligible for such payments
on the basis of a physical or mental handicap. Their handicap may cause them
to be unable to participate in an electronic banking environment unless the
equipment is specially modified to accommodate any handicapping condition
they have, such as braille PIN pads, wheelchair accessible ATMs, etc.
Unless Treasury is prepared to monitor compliance, merely requiring
system compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act is not sufficient.
Leaving it up to the aggrieved individual to somehow find a way to manage while
independently pursuing an ADA claim is an unreasonable expectation for government
benefit recipients who are both poor and disabled.
Systems that do not meet the special needs of handicapped recipients of government
payments must not be considered adequate for requiring electronic transfers
for these federal payees.
Recipients with limited reading skills or no English literacy
at all also have special needs. ATM and POS on-screen messages must meet the
needs of those with limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking.
Systems that do not meet the special needs of those who are
non-English speaking or have limited English proficiency must not be considered
adequate for requiring electronic transfers for these federal payees.
Training for new electronic transfer recipients. Many of
the 10 million unbanked recipients of federal payments may have never had
a relationship with a financial institution or used a credit or debit card
before signing up for the receipt of their federal benefits electronically
in 1999. In recognition of this, there should be an opportunity for anyone
who desires some personal training on how to use an ATM for a balance inquiry
or withdrawal to receive some minimal level of assistance from the financial
institution. This should be in addition to any written training material that
may be provided. The failure to accommodate such requests for assistance could
well keep some who might otherwise be willing to establish an electronic funds
transfer arrangement from doing so.
In addition to providing written materials, financial institutions
offering Direct Deposit Too or federally established EBT accounts should be
required to provide in-person training upon request.
Opportunity for new electronic transfer recipients to choose
their own PINs (personal identification numbers). Our strong preference would
be for all electronic delivery systems to use PIN self-selection as the norm
to reduce the likelihood of the individual's needing to write the number down
and carry it with him or her in order to remember it. We recognize however
that PIN assignment is more likely to be the norm. In such cases, individuals
must be notified at the time of card issuance of the procedures to follow
if they would prefer to change their PIN to a self-selected number. Moreover,
there must be a simple process to effectuate such a change that does not delay
the individuals' access to their federal payments.
Direct Deposit Too and federally established EBT accounts
must provide for a simple and quick means for recipients with an assigned PIN
to change to a number of their own choosing.
Reasonable procedures for PIN replacement and card replacement.
It is critical that any electronic system for delivering federal payments
have established procedures for promptly responding to recipient requests
for a replacement of either the ATM card or the PIN. The need to get a replacement
card or PIN could arise for any number of reasons, including the loss of the
card, damage to the card or the magnetic strip on the card, failure to remember
the assigned PIN, or recipient concern that the card and/or PIN has been compromised.
Use of the card and PIN may well be the only way that federal payees can access
the benefits they need to pay their bills and provide for the bare necessities.
Simple procedures for requesting and promptly obtaining a
replacement card and/or PIN must be in place and a clear explanation of the
steps an individual must take to initiate this process must be included in the
informational materials provided about the account.
________________________
1. The National Consumer Law Center is a
nonprofit organization specializing in consumer credit issues on behalf of low-income
people. We work with thousands of legal services, government and privates attorneys
around the country, representing low-income and elderly individuals, who request
our assistance with the analysis of credit transactions to determine appropriate
claims and defenses their clients might have.(2)
2. The National Consumer Law Center, Inc.
(NCLC) is a nonprofit Massachusetts corporation founded in 1969 at Boston College
School of Law and dedicated to the interests of low-income consumers. NCLC provides
legal and technical consulting and assistance on consumer law issues to legal
services, government and private attorneys across the country. Cost of Credit
(NCLC 1995), Truth in Lending (NCLC 1996) and Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices (NCLC 1991), three of twelve practice treatises published
and annually supplemented by NCLC, and our newsletter, NCLC Reports Consumer
Credit & Usury Ed., describe the law currently applicable to all types
of consumer loan transactions. - -- --
3. The Consumer Federation of America is
a nonprofit association of some 250 pro-consumer groups, with a combined membership
of 50 million people. CFA was founded in 1968 to advance consumers' interests
through advocacy and education.
4. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition
(NCRC) is the nation's largest CRA (Community Reinvestment Act) membership organization.
The goal of NCRC is to increase fair and equal access to credit, capital and
banking services. NCRC, representing over 615 national, regional and local community
organizations seeks to support and provide tools to build community and individual
net worth.
5. The Organization for a New Equality (O.N.E.)
is a multi-racial organization whose top priority is expanding economic opportunity
to people who have historically been excluded from the economic mainstream.
Established in 1985 by the Reverend Dr. Charles R. Stith as a non-profit organization,
O.N.E. is working to develop and implement new economic strategies to promote
equal opportunity and encourage change.
6. Data from the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances, (which involved interviews of 4,299 families from all income brackets)
found that 15 percent reported that they did not have a checking account. The
following reasons were provided by these families for not having a checking
account:
27% said they did not write enough checks to make one worthwhile;
20.5% said they did not have enough money;
Nearly 29% reported that they did not like to deal with banks;
and
Just under 10% each gave as their reason either high minimum
balance requirements, an inability to manage or balance an account, or bank
service charges they deemed to be too high.
Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey
of Consumer Finances. Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 83, No. 1, Jan. 1997
at 7.
On the other hand, a recently completed study involving a much smaller sample
of unbanked direct federal benefit recipients found:
47% said they did not have enough money to have an account;
21% said they had no need for an account; and
6% said that bank fees were too high.
Much smaller percentages cited concerns about bounced checks,
overuse of ATM's, bad credit histories, distrust of banks, privacy, or having
their assets frozen in the event of a legal judgment.
Department of the Treasury Financial Management Service, Mandatory
EFT Demographic Study, Executive Summary, April 22, 1997 at 3-4.
7. In fact, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency has recognized the need to determine why so many households
in the U.S. do not participate in the financial mainstream. The OCC has recently
embarked upon a research effort to answer this question.
8. "At a minimum the Government will
save 28 cents per check on postage, printing supplies, and paper; and avoid
check costs of 28 million for every one hundred million payments converted to
EFT." EFT-99 Facts, prepared by the Department of the Treasury,
Financial Management Service.
9. The ATM related fees are reasonable examples
based upon various proposals that have been discussed. The POS fees are just
guesswork on NCLC's part, based on experience with the onset and growth of ATM
fees.
10. This assumes three separate withdrawals,
each with a charge $1.
11. The fees from the home bank and the
surcharges from use of another bank's ATM are likely to be imposed for the same
transaction.
12. The Treasury study found that SSI check
recipients are far more likely to not have a bank account (58%). Department
of the Treasury Financial Management Service, Mandatory EFT Demographic
Study, Executive Summary, April 22, 1997 at 3.
13. One also needs to assume for this example
that this individual lives in one of the majority of states that does not provide
additional state benefits to SSI recipients.
14. This is the current SSI monthly payment
for an individual living independently and completely self-supporting. Someone
living in another's household and receiving meals and other sustenance receives
a payment of $322.67. Couples living independently receive $363 each. (Information
provided by Social Security Administration, May 20, 1997.)
15. See information in Part 2 on fees of
regulated and unregulated check cashers in different states.
16. Department of the Treasury Financial
Management Service, Mandatory EFT Demographic Study, Executive Summary,
April 22, 1997.
19. The amendment to 31 U.S.C. §3332 requires
recipients of federal funds after January 1, 1999 to "(1) designate 1 or
more financial institutions or other authorized agents to which such
payments shall be made; and
"(2) provide to the federal agency that makes or authorizes
the payment information necessary for the recipient to receive electronic funds
transfer payment through each institution or agent designated under paragraph
(1)." (emphasis added).
20. " Financial institution means any
bank, savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, or similar institution."
31 C.F.R. §208.2(e).
21. According to a recent study of fringe
banking in Milwaukee: "Customers pay far more for services provided by
a check cashing business than they pay for the same services at a conventional
bank. Fees for cashing payroll checks nationwide generally range between one
percent and three percent of the face value of the check. For personal checks
the range was generally between 1.7 percent and 20 percent, averaging around
8 percent. In some instances, however, fees and interest rates have been reported
as high as 2000 percent. A study by the New York Office of the Public Advocate
found that a check cashing customer with an annual income of $17,000 will pay
almost $250 a year at a check cashing business for services that would cost
$60 at a bank. The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City reported that a family
with a $24,000 annual income using a check cashing business will spend almost
$400 in fees for services that would cost under $110 at a bank." (Citations
omitted). Squires and O'Connor, Fringe Banking in Milwaukee: The Rise of
Check Cashing Businesses and the Emergence of Two-Tiered Banking System. (1997)
at 5,6.
22. Payday loans are generally provided
by check cashers who agree to cash a post-dated personal check with the understanding
that it will not be deposited until the customer's next payday. "Customers
can receive $50 for a check written in the amount of $60 and dated 14 days after
the cash is provided. ... The effective annual interest rate for this loan is
1,092 percent." Ibid, at 11, 12.
23. The legal standard applicable to judge
these transactions thus becomes one of "unconscionability." Unconscionability
generally refers to a transaction "which is so one sided that only one
under delusion would make it and only one unfair and dishonest would accept
it." See, Cobb v. Monarch Finance Company, 913 F.Supp 1164,
1179 (N.D.Ill. 1995).
24. Treasury's use of "default"
banks to receive all the direct deposits for all recipients who fail to designate
a financial institution will provide a significant opportunity for Treasury
to ensure that there are adequate ATMs and POS devices throughout the low income
community accessible at little or no cost to these Direct Deposit recipients.
25. As the average Social Security payment
is approximately $700 a month, it is reasonable to assume that the average payment
to the unbanked might be slightly lower, say $500 a month. 10 million (unbanked)
times $500, equals $5 billion of new deposits a month. Roughly, dividing that
by 50 (states) yields additional deposits on a state level of about $100 million
a month.
26. Competition does not work in the traditional
sense in the low income community. While competition was deemed to provide adequate
protections for consumers, for the poor it has been a dismal failure. Generally,
reverse competition has prevailed - the more expensive providers have prospered
in low income and minority communities. In fact deregulation of interest rates
and credit terms has caused far more harm than good for poor people. Deregulation
of basic loan terms has only allowed high cost lenders to charge more to people
who do not have the means to obtain better deals.
27. Indeed in some cases, the first business
was the finance company, which then created the holding company and associated
national bank as the structure to avoid the imposition of state usury statutes.
28. If too many of the "unbanked"
continue to meet this hardship definition, then it behooves the federal government
to consider incentives to financial institutions to create accounts which meet
these minimum standards.
29. See Rental Dealer News (August
1993), at 11-12.
30. A recent 8th Circuit case found that
the 46%-746% interest rates charged by rent to own dealers was ample justification
for a permanent injunction against dealers operating in the state of Minnesota
in standard modes. Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc. 95 F.3d 645, 653 (8th
Cir. 1996).
33. John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking:
Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor (Russell Sage Foundation
1994).
34. In Re Wernly, 91 B.R. 702 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988).
35. This quote is from the complaint filed
by the Virginia Attorney General in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia,
ex rel. Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General v. Bar D Financial Services, Inc. (d/b/a
Payday).
36. Brown and Cooper v. C.I.L. Inc.,
January 28, 1996, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4917.
37. For an example of a case
in which a court found that a series of transactions may have been "unconscionable,"
or "not inconsistent with an absence of meaningful choice," see, Cobb
v. Monarch Finance Company, 913 F.Supp 1164, 1179 (N.D.Ill. 1995). In this
case, the consumer entered into a total of ten separate loans from three finance
companies: (1) four loans, each with a principle of $690, and annual percentage
rate (APR) of 101%; (2) five loans, each with a principle of $700, an APR of
96.43%; and (3) one in the amount of $500, an APR of 57.22%. All loans created
a similar payment mechanism. A bank account was created on behalf of the consumer,
to which an allotted portion of her paycheck was electronically and directly
deposited. The allotment was then immediately transferred from the consumer's
account to the finance company account.